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Abstract
In this paper we review and discuss some challenges in insuring flood risk in Europe
on the national level, including high correlation of damages. Making use of recent
advances in extreme value theory, we furthermore model flood risk with heavy-tailed
distributions and their truncated counterparts, and apply the discussed techniques to
an inflation- and building-value-adjusted annual data set of flood losses in Europe.
The analysis leads to Value-at-Risk estimates for individual countries and for Europe
as a whole, allowing to quantify the diversification potential for flood risk in Europe.
Finally we identify optimal risk pooling possibilities in case a joint insurance strategy
on the European level cannot be realized and quantify the resulting inefficiency in
terms of additional necessary solvency capital. Thus the results also contribute to the
ongoing discussion on how public risk transfer mechanisms can supplement missing
private insurance coverage.
1 Introduction
Floods rank amongst the most wide-reaching and commonly occurring natural hazards
in Europe. In the International Disaster Database EM-DAT (Guha-Sapir et al. [9]),
flood events account for 36% of the damages recorded from natural disasters in Europe,
followed by storm events (27%) and earthquakes (21%). The analysis in this paper is
based on data obtained from Munich Re, NatCatSERVICE, 2014 though, which we
would like to gratefully acknowledge here. Losses from floods show an increasing trend,
which is mostly attributable to socio-economic factors, including population growth,
economic development and construction activities in vulnerable areas. However, also
climate change is expected to intensify the impacts of flooding (IPCC 2014 [8]). Hence,
while representing a major issue already today, managing the risk of flooding is ex-
pected to become an even more important topic in the future.
Efficient flood risk management requires a combination of risk reduction, risk retention
and risk transfer. The latter is defined as shifting the burden of disaster loss to another
party (for instance by means of insurance). It represents an important instrument for
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managing the risk resulting from natural perils such as floods and can help mitigat-
ing or minimizing disaster losses. A well implemented plan how to spread economic
risks from extreme events within society and/or transfer them from the victims to the
financial markets is a fundamental adaptation measure that crucially decides on how
impacts from climate change will finally disturb a society. Adequately designed, risk
transfer mechanisms even have the potential to generate incentives for individuals as
well as the collective to actively engage in risk reduction.
With respect to flood events (and natural catastrophes in general) a broad range of
national risk transfer systems can be found in EU member states (see e.g. CEA [5],
IBC [11], Jongman et al. [13], Keskitalo et al. [15], Maccaferri et al. ([20], Seifert et
al. [32], Schwarze and Wagner [31] and Psenner et al. [28]). These vary considerably
regarding their organizational structure and design elements. However, what most
of these systems have in common is some kind of state intervention. The focus of
the present paper is twofold: On the one hand it tackles the question what the role
of the state (or a supranational body such as the EU) can be in the transfer of risk
from floods, given that in many member states, there is not sufficient private insur-
ance coverage for flood events. On the other hand, the paper tries to contribute to
the flood risk modelling literature. Why are we combining these two quite separate
issues? Firstly, the chosen risk modelling technique directly raises the question at
what level a public intervention, such as acting as insurer of last resort, would make
economic sense. Secondly, we try to argue, that if there is a role for public authorities
to intervene in the risk transfer process due to market failure, then the topic of better
availability of damage data supporting better risk modelling, that takes place in the
public domain, becomes a crucial issue as well. There are several proprietary risk
modelling packages around, the validity of which cannot be publicly debated since the
model assumptions are not open to the scientific community. This might be considered
a problem, if public funds are supposed to play a role in risk transfer mechanisms.
The remainder of this paper is structured as follows: Section 2 describes the key chal-
lenges of flood insurance and current approaches of dealing with them. Correlated
risks of flooding are one such troublemaker, often leading to a breakdown of national
insurance supply. However, correlation patterns also can be a positive contribution
to handle risks, if we move to international cooperation in risk transfer. It is only in
section 4, where we elaborate this thought in more detail as we need to have a concrete
look into European flood risk on the national level first. This is carried out in section
3, where we use empirical flood loss data across Europe to calibrate a model and then
determine loss quantiles as required for flood risk management. After a short overview
of other modelling approaches and describing EVT techniques in the context of flood
risk modelling we apply them to a suitably normalized data set of European flood loss
data. A quantitative assessment of diversification potential for flood risk across Eu-
ropean countries is given. As mentioned, Section 4 then discusses possibilities for the
formation of sub-European pooling initiatives, in case a general collaboration on the
European level is not feasible. Note that the quantitative model used in this paper does
not take into account possibly changing flood risk due to climate change. However,
the suggested changes in the flood risk transfer mechanism, that are substantiated by
the quantitative modelling approach followed in this paper, can be seen as a possible
major climate adaptation measure to increase the risk resilience of Europe, irrespec-
tive of whether the risk per se increases or not. Section 5 discusses the results and
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concludes.
2 Key challenges in flood insurance and strate-
gies to handle them
From a supply-side point of view, particular conditions need to be fulfilled in order to
be capable of maintaining the provision of a working insurance system, that is able to
transfer, share and reduce risks (see e.g. Kunreuther and Freeman [18]; Kunreuther
[17]; Prettenthaler and Albrecher [26]). Preconditions for the insurability of an event
usually include the existence of a huge number of similar insurance entities, the deter-
minability, measurability and randomness of the resulting damages – including that
the occurrence and severity of the damage is beyond the control of the insured – as
well as the calculability of the damage probability. Moreover, damages experienced by
the insured entities should occur independently from one another, i.e. they should not
hold any catastrophic damage potential. Lastly, premiums are to remain affordable.
Floods – like most other types of natural perils – however show various characteristics
that make the sustainable provision of a working insurance system at affordable price
challenging.
Small risk collective and adverse selection
One challenge relates to the creation of a risk collective of sufficient size (see e.g.
Prettenthaler and Albrecher [26]). Floods tend to occur at the same place over and
over again. If insuring against floods is voluntary, coverage tends to be demanded
mainly in those areas that show an excessive damage probability. The overrepresen-
tation of ’bad risks’, i.e. with high loss probability, in the collective that demands
insurance especially becomes a problem, if insurance companies have difficulties in
screening clients (i.e. in case of information asymmetries e.g. due to lacking hazard
maps) and/or are not able or allowed to charge risk-based premiums. This situation,
where an individual’s demand for insurance is positively correlated with its risk of loss
and the insurer is unable to account for this additional risk in the price of insurance
(also known as adverse selection problem) causes a vicious circle of increasing pre-
miums and decreasing insurance demand of less endangered potential policyholders.
Hence, adverse selection leads to a small risk collective and can threaten the economic
viability of an insurance system. Common strategies to counteract the problems of too
small risk collectives and adverse selection include the bundling of flood insurance with
other kinds of (preferably) uncorrelated perils (e.g. fire or earthquakes) and risk-based
premiums (see e.g. Prettenthaler and Albrecher [26]; Botzen [3]). The latter also ranks
among the measures against moral hazard, a problem described below. However, it
may result in unaffordable premiums in high risk zones.
Moral hazard
Besides adverse selection, there is a second consequence that may arise from in-
formation asymmetries between insurance companies and policyholders and reduce
insurance demand: the problem of moral hazard (see e.g. Prettenthaler and Albrecher
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[26]; Surminski [33]). It may occur after taking out an insurance policy and refers to
a change in the insured’s behaviour that causes the probability of loss to be higher
than considered when setting up the contract. Examples for changes in the behaviour
of the policyholder include reduced efforts of avoiding damages or of keeping them
at a minimum. The problem of moral hazard – which is not exclusively related to
flood risk but rather represents a key challenge for any insurance product – leads to
a costly cycle of losses and hence makes it difficult to maintain the provision of insur-
ance. Strategies in place to reduce the problem of moral hazard include the – however
somewhat costly – monitoring of insured (see e.g. Botzen [3]) and the introduction of
deductibles, co-insurance or upper limits on coverage. The effectiveness of the latter
tools however remains unclear (Surminski [33]).
Charity hazard
The demand for insurance coverage may also be negatively affected by a lack of risk
awareness (if e.g. information on the exposure is not sufficiently available) or by the
so called charity hazard. The latter refers to the tendency of an individual to forego
purchasing insurance or taking other precautions provided that ex post governmental
assistance or aid from other sources can be anticipated in the event of a disaster (see
e.g. Lewis and Nickerson [19]; Browne and Hoyt [4]; Prettenthaler and Albrecher [26]).
Correlated risks
Besides difficulties in creating a sufficiently large risk collective, there are further
factors making the provision of flood insurance at an affordable price challenging: It
is, for example, difficult to estimate uncertain low-frequency high-impact risks and,
hence, the respective insurance premiums (see e.g. Paudel [24]). Surminski [33, p.260]
mentions in this context that “flood is often regarded as the most technically chal-
lenging type of insurance due to a lack of accurate assessment of exposure, difficulty
in estimating the probability of occurrence of an event and potential losses faced”.
Another challenge regarding the coverage of flood risk results from the possibility of
a catastrophic damage. As natural hazards typically affect large connected areas, the
resulting damages are correlated. Hence, large amounts of capital have to be avail-
able all at once in order to prevent insolvency on the one hand and to be able to
guarantee coverage of the insured damages even in case of damage peaks on the other
hand.Precautions such as the introduction of various limits, the development of insur-
ance pools, reinsurance or the involvement of the international capital markets aim
at limiting the damage burden for the single insurance company and at ensuring the
required capacities (see e.g. Prettenthaler and Albrecher [26]). In the sections that
follow, we will show how international cooperation in risk transfer may also help to
reduce the capital needed to prevent insolvency.
State intervention
Despite the described possibilities of coping with the mentioned challenges, it might
be difficult or even impossible for the private insurance sector to efficiently provide
comprehensive insurance coverage for the whole population on its own. Small risk
collectives, a lack of risk awareness among the population, adverse selection and moral
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hazard as well as the risk of loss accumulation contribute to the facts, (i) that insurance
penetration related to flood risk is often very low, (ii) that coverage is strongly limited
in many cases or only available at high costs and (iii) that only a small part of the losses
resulting from a catastrophic event is covered by insurance. Due to these difficulties,
different kinds and extents of state intervention have developed (see e.g. Paudel [24]),
which include amongst others:
• Providing the necessary framework for private insurance companies to cover flood
risk (e.g. through the provision of nation-wide hazard maps, risk-minimizing
spatial planning and building regulations, legal framework for obligatory coverage
extension or compulsory insurance, etc.)
• Subsidizing insurance premiums
• Acting as (re)insurer of last resort
• Providing ex-post ad-hoc aid (which, however, may lead to negative incentives
such as charity hazard)
• Managing the insurance scheme
• Acting as monopolistic insurance provider
The adequate role of the state in a nation’s risk transfer system is frequently dis-
cussed (see e.g. Paudel [24]) and a variety of systems has evolved in the past, ranging
from a rather passive role of the state via the establishment of an adequate framework
for the insurance industry through to an active role in compensating private dam-
ages (for comprehensive overviews see e.g. CEA [5], IBC [11], Jongman et al. [13],
Keskitalo et al. [15], Maccaferri et al. ([20], Seifert et al. [32], Schwarze and Wagner
[31] and Psenner et al. [28]). When taking an active role in compensating private
damages, acting for instance as an insurer of last resort is seen as principally prefer-
able to governmental ex-post ad-hoc aid (e.g. through compensation funds), since the
latter is related to negative incentive effects. The (hypothetic) Solvency II compliant
capital requirement for the state as an insurer of last resort is not necessarily much
smaller than the Solvency II compliant capital requirement for a primary insurance
pool, though: Prettenthaler and Albrecher [26] e.g. calculated both numbers for a
Public-Private Partnership (PPP) suggested for Austria, where a national pool was
supposed to cover damages up to 3 bn e whilst the government was responsible to
cover the damage beyond that threshold, and the capital requirement proved to be
about the same for both.
Thus, the state, even though it is the biggest possible risk collective, still may be
overcharged. This does not come as a surprise, since the high (spatial) correlation of
flood risk leads to high aggregate risk for any fund whose portfolio is not spatially
diversified. But whilst the typical European nation states are composed of only a few
river basins (if they belong to more than one at all), the European Union is composed
of a big enough number of river basins, rainfall patterns and climatic zones. It only
was logic thus, that the big flood events of 2002 led to the establishment of the Euro-
pean Union Solidarity Fund (EUSF). ”The EUSF supplements countries’ own public
expenditure to finance essential emergency operations. These include: restoring essen-
tial infrastructure e.g. energy, water, health and education; temporary accommodation
and costs of emergency services to meet immediate needs; securing of prevention in-
frastructures, such as dams; measures to protect cultural heritage; clean-up operations.
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Damage to private property or income loss, considered insurable, is not covered ” (EC
Regulation No 2012/2002 and EU Regulation No 661/2014). In that way, the EU has
also somehow become an insurer of last resort for the national public expenditures
associated to floods. Clearly this engagement does not include the expenditures the
member states incur in their own role as insurers of damage to private property. But
at least there is a justification for extending the discussion on the role of the state
from the level of individual member states to that of the EU as a supranational orga-
nization that especially can make use of the diversity of its member states in the sense
of risk diversification, if any role is adopted. To make it clear: Since the state has
to intervene anyhow, providing primary insurance or reinsurance on its own is not a
completely awkward option. But it is rather costly for an individual state. However,
if a state cooperates with other states having a different flood risk portfolio can reduce
the cost of providing this type of insurance. One would expect that the flood risk
across European nations is sufficiently diverse such that there is a strong economic
incentive for cooperation.
Of course, it is very unlikely that the EU member states would easily agree upon
a specific role, the Union could play in (re-)insuring overall national flood risks, given
the diversity of approaches being followed in this respect on the national level: Some
countries (e.g. Germany, Italy, United Kingdom, and – just recently – Finland) show
(purely) market-based systems, sometimes systematically coupled with state-funded
ad-hoc relief. Others (e.g. Spain and France) exhibit public or quasi-public monopoly
insurance provision. A third group of countries (e.g. Austria, Denmark, Belgium, and
non-EU member Norway) manage flood risk transfer either mainly via tax-financed
public disaster funds or by means of a combination between public disaster fund and
private insurance provision. Due to this diversity - evolved in the light of diverse his-
torical and cultural backgrounds - any harmonization project that seeks to prescribe
one solution for all European member states seems a very demanding task, whose
usefulness is to be questioned critically. Even discussions within nations on reforming
the national systems usually take very long as the examples of Romania, the United
Kingdom, Austria, Germany or the Netherlands show (see e.g. Prettenthaler and Al-
brecher [26]; Surminski [32]; Surminski et al. [31]). This is why the reform option put
forward in this paper is of a completely different nature. Instead of harmonizing na-
tional legal frameworks it focuses on exploiting the flood risk diversification potential
available within the European Union. Once the diversification potential is known, it
may well be that bilateral agreements of risk pooling evolve, not necessitating a unan-
imous stance towards this issue shared by all member states. It is this diversification
potential that is illustrated in the following sections and to the calculation of which
we now turn.
3 Modelling Flood Risk with EVT Techniques
3.1 Other approaches
Since our modelling method solely focusses on Extreme Value Theory (EVT), it might
be a good idea to also give a short overview on other approaches first: Quantitative
flood loss modelling has received quite some attention in recent literature (although
due to the complexity of the subject flood models are recognized to leave considerable
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uncertainty, see Merz et al. [21]). Flood losses can be divided into direct and indirect
damages, each of which may be further divided into tangible and intangible damages
(Merz et al. [22]). The literature on loss modelling has mostly focused on tangible
direct damages, since they are easier to quantify than the other kinds of damages.
The relative1 or absolute monetary damage is typically explained by characteristics
(factors) of the flood, such as inundation depth, flow velocity, duration of inundation,
time of the flood (day/night and season), contamination and flood warning (Merz
et al. [22]). In this type of analysis the exposed assets are commonly divided into
homogeneous groups (e.g. type of buildings) and for each group the relative (or ab-
solute) damage is described as a function of the considered factors. The main factor
is usually inundation depth, leading to the so-called depth-damage function, which is
derived for a region or a country. For a review of available models see Merz et al. [23].
The following flood models are for instance in this vein:
• FLEMOps (Thieken et al. [35]) for the private sector in Germany. The relative
loss is explained by water depth, contamination, building type and quality of the
building and is based on the loss data obtained between 2002 and 2006 in the
Elbe and Danube catchments in Germany.
• FLEMOcs (Kreibich et al. [16]) for industrial sector in Germany. The relative loss
is a function of water depth, contamination, business sector, number of employees
and precaution.
• Multi-Coloured Manual (Penning-Rowsell et al. [25]) for the UK, where the ab-
solute loss is explained by water depth, flood duration, building type and age.
• Damage Scanner (see, Jongman et al. [12] for a review) are the standard methods
to estimate the flood economic loss based on water depth in the Netherlands.
• A depth-damage function for the special case of dam breach scenarios is provided
by Prettenthaler et al. [27].
• The JRC model (Huizinga [10]), which is a pan-European damage model describ-
ing absolute monetary loss as a function of water depth. This model is applied
by Feyen et al. [7] to evaluate the impact of climate change on fluvial flood risk
in Europe.
Jongman et al. [12] applied seven damage estimation models (four of them from the
above models) to estimate flood losses of two specific regions and compared estimated
to observed values. Results were, however, rather unsatisfactory, which indicates that
flood risk modelling efforts need further attention, see also Merz et al. [23].
Due to their ’black-box character’ – in the sense that they are not publicly available
– the approaches used by commercial risk modelling companies (e.g. AIR, RMS, JBA
Risk Management, Ambiental Technical Solutions Ltd., etc.) can unfortunately not
be discussed in detail in this paper. However, the field seems to be quite dynamic,
with regular releases of new or updated models. Lately, commercial flood risk model
providers have also emphasized the importance for (European) insurers to look across
national borders and think about the spatial correlations of flood risk across Europe
(see e.g. Savina Savina [30]). Whereas RMS, for instance, initially only offered flood
risk models for individual countries (including the UK, Belgium and Germany), they
1I.e. the monetary value of the damage relative to the total value of the asset
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released a pan-Europe flood model encompassing 13 countries in 2015.
The Solvency II Directive of the European Commission within the new regula-
tory framework for the European insurance industry prescribes capital requirements
for insurance companies according to a Value-at-Risk (VaR) at the 99.5% level, i.e.
insurance companies are required to hold sufficient capital to remain solvent with a
probability of 99.5%. However, linked to the implementation of this rule is the non-
trivial task of estimating such extreme quantiles. This is particularly challenging since
most often the empirical data available for these estimations are very limited in scope.
Clearly, one needs to employ some extrapolation techniques, as in most cases the time
interval of available observations does not include such an extreme event. Extreme
value theory (EVT) is a natural choice towards that end, see e.g. Beirlant et al. [1].
It provides a tool-kit to model the distribution of extreme events by using patterns
of the largest observations. In particular, it is a sensible way to describe tails of a
distribution based on smaller observations, and hence provides a reasonable way to
extrapolate data sets beyond their range, something that is needed to calculate the
VaRs. In this paper we will apply EVT methodology to model the tail of the distri-
bution of flood risks, for individual European countries and for Europe as a whole. In
particular, in view of the Solvency II guidelines, we aim to establish estimates on the
VaR at the 99.5% level on the basis of historical loss data, considering also the change
of the building stock (value) over the years. Whereas in insurance practice, flood risk
may eventually be pooled with other risks, and the VaR reported to the regulator will
include a number of further factors such as the assets of the company, loss reserves etc.,
the specification of the stand-alone VaR figure is a natural indicator for the underlying
flood-specific risks of each country, indicating the potential and likely exposure.
3.2 Methods
Flood loss data often exhibit a heavy tail, with the largest observed values typically
dominating the others substantially. Heavy-tailed distributions often provide reason-
able fits in such contexts. Popular heavy-tailed distributions are the log-normal dis-
tribution with cumulative distribution function (cdf)
FY (y) = Φ
( log y − µ
σ
)
, y > 0 (1)
(where Φ is the cdf of a standard normal distribution), the Weibull distribution with
cdf
FY (y) = 1− exp[(−y/τ)α], y > 0, (2)
with parameters τ > 0 and α > 0 (where the heavy-tailed case 0 < α < 1 is of
prime interest in the present context), and the classical Pareto distribution with two
parameters α, θ > 0, which assigns a power decay for the tail
FY (y) = 1− (θ/y)α, y ≥ θ, (3)
and often provides a very reasonable fit for large losses. Whereas these two distribu-
tions result from a simple transformation of a normal and exponential, respectively,
random variable (which may be considered as a sufficient justification of its choice,
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looking for compromise between simplicity, clarity and flexibility of models), the Pareto
distribution in addition appears naturally as a limit distribution for maxima of sam-
ples (see e.g. [1]). As one is mainly concerned with the tail of the fitted distribution,
this link also gives guidelines on how to fit such a distribution only to the larger values
among all observations. Despite the fact that the shape of much of the distribution
tail may be well described by such a model, there may be many situations in practice,
for which there is a natural upper bound for loss random variables (such as the overall
property value in flood prone areas). In a recent paper, Beirlant et al. [2] adapt clas-
sical EVT techniques to fitting procedures for such a truncated Pareto model, where
(3) is adapted to
FY (y) =
1− (θ/y)α
1− (θ/T )α , θ ≤ y ≤ T. (4)
The upper bound T will typically not be known, but can be estimated from the data.
One can then also compare the goodness of fit of various models (with and without
truncation) and choose the one that is most plausible for the given data situation.
In this paper we apply such an analysis to annual flood loss data for residential
buildings, aggregated per country for 27 European Union countries.2 Out of these
27 countries, 7 countries have less than 5 data points, which we consider to be not
sufficient to see enough statistical structure in the data to include them in the analysis.
In addition, we also exclude the Netherlands since due to extensive protection levels
by dams and dikes, the nature of losses is quite different from those of other countries.3
Hence we restrict ourselves to 19 countries. The last year of reported annual losses for
all countries is 2013, but the first year differs from country to country. For each of the
19 countries4 considered within the analysis, Table 1 depicts the first year of reported
loss, the total number of years comprised by the record and the number of years with
a loss occurring. The maximum amount of losses for each country is included in Table
2. For each country and year, we normalize the loss data by the overall residential
building value. Both damage data and building values are inflation adjusted.
For the fitting of the Pareto and truncated Pareto distribution, we apply the
method of Beirlant et al. [2], which is an adaptation of the classical Hill estimator. This
method works remarkably well on simulated data with truncation, and in the limit of
the truncation parameter T going to ∞, the procedure retains the classical EVT Hill
estimator for α . Note that if the largest k data points are used for the estimation,
the parameter θ is naturally chosen to be the smallest of these used values. There are
various suggestions and algorithms available in the literature towards a suitable choice
of k. Here we adopt a covariance criterion (as suggested in Beirlant et al. [2]).
The parameters of the log-normal and Weibull distributions are estimated by using
classical maximum likelihood estimation. We use Q-Q plots to compare the quality
2We gratefully acknowledge Munich Re for providing data from their loss database NatCatSERVICE
(Munich Re [29]).
3The overall insurability of flood risk in the Netherlands with large parts of the country below sea level
is in any case a general subject of debate. That is, why insurance cover is almost non-existent in the
Netherlands (see e.g. Seifert et al. [32]).
4AT: Austria, BE: Belgium, BG: Bulgaria, HR: Croatia, CY: Cyprus, CZ: Czech Republic, FR: France,
DE: Germany, GR: Greece, HU: Hungary, IE: Ireland, IT: Italy, PL: Poland, PT: Portugal, RO: Romania,
SK: Slovakia, ES: Spain, SE: Sweden, UK: United Kingdom.
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AT BE BG HR CY CZ FR DE GR HU
First year 1980 1991 1991 1999 1992 1993 1980 1980 1982 1996
# Data 34 23 23 15 22 21 34 34 32 18
# Loss > 0 24 11 11 7 6 14 30 32 18 12
IE IT PL PT RO SK ES SE UK
First year 1990 1980 1991 1980 1992 1997 1980 1985 1980
# Data 24 34 23 34 22 17 34 29 34
# Loss > 0 16 31 17 15 19 11 32 9 32
Table 1: First year, number of years with data and number of years with losses, per country
of fits among each other and on the basis of those (together with empirical mean-
excess plots and related methods) decide for the most suitable among the different
models for each country. Clearly, there is a certain degree of subjectivity in the
corresponding choice, but in view of the small number of available data points one
cannot use classical goodness-of-fit tests (like a χ2-test), which is a well-known artifact
in EVT. The procedure adopted here seems to be a reasonable compromise between
scientific rigor, intuition and experience when working with this kind of data. For
illustration, Figure 1 depicts the log-log plot
(logXn−j+1,n, log(j/n)), j = 1, . . . , n, (5)
for those countries which pass the test for a truncated Pareto distribution given in
Beirlant et al. [2]. One clearly sees the deviation from the (linear) non-truncated
Pareto pattern at the right-hand end of the plots.
3.3 Fitted Models and Risk Measures
Figure 2 depicts the Q-Q plots as a measure of goodness of fit for each candidate
distribution and each country (in those cases where the truncated Pareto assumption
is rejected, we do not give the respective Q-Q plot, as then no estimate for the upper
bound is available). From these plots, we choose the most suitable model for each
country. For Croatia the fit is not very satisfactory (possibly due to insufficient data),
we still include it in the analysis, but give a word of caution to the respective numbers.
Given that insurance solutions should account also for a massive failure of dams, a
high protection level by dams should be treated separately. Here the given numbers
do certainly not reflect the risk under a major ’failure of dams’ scenario. For Europe
we aggregated the annual losses over all countries and then applied the same fitting
procedure as for the individual countries.
For determining the VaR (i.e. the quantile) at the 99.5% level, which is a quantity
relevant for solvency purposes, there is a simple procedure in the present case: if
only data points larger than θ are finally used for the estimation of the tail, and a
conditional distribution FY is chosen to be the best model above that level θ, that is
P{Y ≥ y|Y ≥ θ} = 1− FY (y), (6)
it follows that
P(Y ≥ y) = ζθ(1− FY (y)) := 1− β,
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Figure 1: Log-log plots for annual flood loss data by country. The dashed blue line refers
to a Pareto fit, whereas the solid black line refers to a truncated Pareto fit.
where ζθ = P(Y > θ) can be estimated by k/n (here k is the number of used obser-
vations and n is the size of the entire sample) and β is the level at which the VaR is
calculated. For a chosen value of β (0.995 in the present case), the VaR is then the
implicit solution of the above equation for y.
In recent years several alternatives to VaR as a risk measure have been proposed. The
most prominent alternative is expected shortfall at confidence level β
ESβ(Y ) = E(Y |Y ≥ VaRβ(Y )) (7)
This risk measure is e.g. implemented in the Swiss Solvency Test for β = 0.99. It
has some desirable properties, and even if most European countries due to regulatory
rules adhere to the VaR, we give here also the respective ES numbers for comparison.
Table 2 depicts for each country the chosen distribution, the largest observed in-
surance loss (both in absolute terms and in % of the building value) and the fitted
11
upper bound T (in case the truncated Pareto distribution is the best model). The fifth
column gives the building values of 2013, whereas the last four columns present the
resulting VaR (99.5 %) and ES (99%) in terms of percentage of 2013 building values
as well as in absolute value, in addition, the value at risk and expected shortfall for
all mentioned distributions have been showed in Appendix. One sees that for some
countries the ES is considerably higher than the respective VaR, particularly for those
countries where the log-normal distribution is the best fit. Figure 3 depicts the relative
value of the resulting VaR for each country, indicating which countries are most prone
to flood risk, given the data analysed.
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Figure 2: QQ-plots for annual flood loss data (in logarithmic scale) by country. The black
circles, blue squares, red triangles and green pluses respectively refer to a truncated Pareto,
Pareto, log-normal and Weiblull fit.
4 Joint Risk Pooling: A thought experiment
The sum of the VaRs of the individual countries in Table 2 represents the over-
all capital amount that would be needed at the 99.5% safety level in case each
country dealt with flood risks stand-alone. With 141,052 Mio e it is almost
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Largest Obs. T(TP) BV-2013 VaR(99.5%) ES(99%)
Country Dist. % BV Mio e % BV Mio e % BV Mio e % BV Mio e
Austria TP 0.455 3,970 5.167 914,593 2.53 23,139 3.22 29,460
Belgium TP 0.027 211 0.086 792,452 0.074 586 0.081 644
Bulgaria TP 0.514 773 2.464 141,053 1.983 2,797 2.22 3,134
Croatia LN 0.079 158 Inf 197,198 0.122 241 0.66 1,309
Cyprus TP 0.017 6 0.098 40,062 0.076 30 0.091 36
Czech R. TP 1.3 4,080 3.644 323,412 3.181 10,288 3.33 10,779
France LN 0.03 1,660 Inf 6,001,039 0.051 3,078 0.106 6,396
Germany TP 0.167 14,900 0.286 8,704,763 0.26 22,632 0.264 23,000
Greece TP 0.042 208 0.279 511,834 0.189 967 0.225 1,153
Hungary LN 0.223 673 Inf 291,411 2.231 6,501 6.9 20,138
Ireland LN 0.145 410 Inf 286,464 0.322 922 0.475 1,363
Italy TP 0.391 12,203 0.621 3,366,374 0.57 19,188 0.576 19,399
Poland TP 0.483 5,160 2.186 1,065,883 1.794 19,122 1.89 20,202
Portugal TP 0.21 1,090 4.012 513,923 2.084 10,710 3 15,415
Romania TP 0.594 1,690 0.985 266,283 0.927 2,468 0.935 2,491
Slovakia LN 0.28 490 Inf 175,723 1.2 2108 2.75 4830
Spain TP 0.209 3,670 0.343 2,161,979 0.314 6,798 0.316 6,827
Sweden TP 0.003 32 0.009 1,175,719 0.007 82 0.008 97
United K. TP 0.137 6,000 0.224 4,583,064 0.205 9,395 0.207 9,492
Sum 141,052 176,165
Europe TP 0.093 29,842 0.131 31,513,229 0.122 38,446 0.123 38,761
Table 2: Chosen model, largest observed insurance loss, fitted upper bound T , total building
value 2013, 99.5 % VaR and 99% ES for 19 EU member states and their aggregate
four times as large as the VaR calculated on the basis of the aggregated loss
data of all 19 member states (referred to as ”Europe” in Table 2), which in-
corporates the dependence structure between the individual countries. In other
words, pooling the flood risk across these 19 EU member states reduces the
capital requirements5 to 38,446 Mio e. Hence, there is a strong diversification
potential for pooling flood risk across countries. Based on this observation, the
implementation of a flood damage pool or a joint reinsurance either at EU level,
or – if no agreement at EU level could be achieved – between subsets of EU
countries, seems a reform option worthwhile to consider. Given the available
data set and based on our model assumptions, we can hence identify the most
effective Joint Risk Pooling Initiatives (JRPIs) in terms of reducing solvency
capital requirements.
To that end, we divide the 19 EU member states into two groups. The
first group has a rather satisfactory data base available (correspondingly the
goodness-of-fit of the calibrated models is quite satisfactory) and constitutes
the countries with larger losses (in fact about 80% of the over-all reported losses
in the data set, and – coincidentally – also about 80% of the total building
values are located in these countries). This group includes the seven countries
Austria, France, Germany, Italy, Portugal, Spain and United Kingdom. The
5The VaR figures reported to the regulator will typically substantially differ from the stand-alone VaR
figures of 2, since flood risk is often pooled with other risks and further factors are relevant (assets of the
company, loss reserves, etc. will be considered).
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Figure 3: Relative value of the 99.5%-VaR, per country
second group consists of the remaining 12 countries, for which there are fewer
data points available, but also flood risk is less prominent.
For the pooling of countries of Group 1, denote byX1, X2, . . . , X7 the random
variables representing losses of these seven countries. The goal is now to find
the number of clusters G (and the number Ng of member countries in cluster g)
which minimizes the sum of VaRs of the G clusters:
VaRG = min
G∑
i=1
VaR
(∑
j∈Ng
Xj
)
(8)
For each cluster, we aggregate the loss data of the Ng countries, fit a truncated
Pareto distribution to these and compute the respective VaR (with the exception
of France, the truncated Pareto was the best model for these countries anyway).
Doing this analysis for all possible combinations of two and three clusters, we can
identify the optimal clusters. Tables 3 and 4 show the countries and VaR figures
of the resulting clusters. In the last two columns we also give the corresponding
numbers when ES is used as the risk measure.
For pooling of the remaining 12 countries (Group 2), the available data situa-
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Cluster Countries VaR(99.5%) ES(99%)Individual Cluster Individual Cluster
1
Austria 23,139
6,893
29,460
6,987France 3,078 6,396
Portugal 10,710 15,415
2
Germany 22,632
26,165
23,000
26,184Italy 19,188 19,399Spain 6,798 6,827
UK 9,395 9,492
Sum 94,940 33,148 110,026 33,171
Table 3: VaR and ES values of two clusters
Cluster Countries VaR(99.5%) ES(99%)Individual Cluster Individual Cluster
1 Austria 23,139 7,966 29,460 7,967UK 9,395 9,492
2 Portugal 10,710 6,607 15415 6,407Spain 6,798 6827
3
France 3,078
27,827
6,396
27,827Germany 22,632 23,000
Italy 19,188 19,399
Sum 94,940 42,400 110,026 42,401
Table 4: VaR and ES values of three clusters
tion does not allow to proceed in the same way as for Group 1, because there are
not enough joint data points available for losses in the same years. One can in-
stead use a hierarchical clustering algorithm (see e.g. Kaufman and Rousseeuw
[14]). In general, clustering by such an algorithm is based on a certain measure of
distance between the clustering objects, with the goal to minimize the distance
within and maximize the distance between clusters. In the present context, this
distance can be the pairwise correlation, so that each cluster consists of the
countries that are the least correlated with each other, in view of diversification
benefits. To determine the pairwise correlation between losses of the countries,
one can e.g. use the classical Pearson correlation
rP =
(xi − x¯)(yi − y¯)√∑n
i=1(xi − x¯)2
√∑n
i=1(yi − y¯)2
,
or the Spearman rank correlation
rS =
(rg(xi)− rgx)(rg(yi)− rgy)√∑n
i=1(rg(xi)− rgx)2
√∑n
i=1(yi − rgy)2
,
where (x1, y1), . . . , (xn, yn) are the joint observations of n flood losses, and rg(xi)
is the rank of observation xi in the univariate sample. Recall that the Spear-
16
man rank correlation is the Pearson correlation coefficient of the grades of the
distribution, and in that way measures for monotonic relationships between two
random variables, whereas the Pearson correlation coefficient itself measures lin-
ear correlation only. Linear correlation is a very natural concept in the world of
normal distributions, but in the present context, the marginal random variables
are strongly skewed and heavy-tailed so that the Spearman correlation may be
seen as a more natural choice (see e.g. Embrechts et al. [6]). Correspondingly
we use it here. Table 5 shows the pairwise Spearman correlation of countries in
Group 2. When deciding for three clusters according to the clustering algorithm
described above, they turn out to be
1. Croatia and Czech Republic
2. Bulgaria, Greece, Ireland and Romania
3. Belgium, Cyprus, Hungary, Poland, Slovakia and Sweden.
If one only allows for two clusters of countries, the first cluster is as above and
the second cluster is the aggregation of the second and third cluster above.
BE BG HR CY CZ GR HU IE PL RO SK SE
BE 1 -0.27 0.05 -0.85 -0.20 -0.10 -0.30 -0.21 -0.16 -0.11 -0.25 -0.63
BG 1 0.14 -0.43 -0.38 -0.19 0.21 -0.73 0.15 0.30 0.17 -0.55
HR 1 -0.55 -0.34 0.37 -0.13 -0.52 0.33 0.11 0.37 -0.10
CY 1 -0.11 -0.31 -0.47 -0.63 -0.56 -0.45 -0.58 -0.77
CZ 1 0.26 0.03 0.06 0.20 0.05 -0.05 -0.18
GR 1 -0.05 -0.19 0.20 0.22 0.26 -0.10
HU 1 -0.38 0.04 0.36 0.08 -0.44
IE 1 -0.34 -0.47 -0.68 0.15
PL 1 0.49 0.60 -0.01
RO 1 0.57 0.06
SK 1 -0.19
SE 1
Table 5: Pairwise Spearman correlation for relative losses of countries in Group 2
Having identified reasonable clusters on the basis of bivariate correlations, it
would now be the next step to calculate VaR figures for the resulting clusters.
However, the scarce data situation for the countries of Group 2 does not allow
for reasonable estimates on quantiles of each cluster. For fitting a distribution to
the aggregated losses of a cluster, only data from those years covered by the loss
record of every country in the cluster can be used. Unfortunately this reduces
the number of available summed claims too much to provide meaningful fits for
their distribution (and then estimate a 99.5% VaR), and we hence restrict our-
selves at this point to simply outlining the clusters as given above. In addition
we remind the even more severe data limitation for Croatia.
Remark. Tables 2, 3 and 4 indicate that under suitable collaboration be-
tween countries, diversification can significantly reduce the total required sol-
vency capital for flood insurance. Such numbers bring up the question on how
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such a reduced aggregate capital requirement should then be subdivided (”allo-
cated”) to the individual countries. In the literature some suggestions for that
have been developed, among them the Euler allocation principle, see e.g. Tasche
[34]. In order to implement such an allocation procedure, one needs to fully spec-
ify a dependence model for the multivariate loss distribution across countries.
However, due to the limited amount of available data, we do not pursue the
formulation of such a concrete dependence model in the present paper, as our
focus is on the aggregate view. Clearly, with a more refined data set available,
it will be interesting to elaborate further on such aspects in the future.
5 Conclusion
In this paper we discussed some challenges in flood risk assessment and man-
agement for Europe. High spatial correlation of flood damages is one of the
obstacles for a well-functioning flood insurance scheme on the national level.
However, understanding the dependence structure across national flood damage
data, (non-)correlation can become part of the solution to provide flood insur-
ance for Europe: Based on a data set comprising annual flood losses of most EU
member states, we calibrated flood models using a methodology for truncated
distributions developed recently in extreme value theory. The resulting models
provided a tool to quantify flood risk diversification potentials. Based on the
results, our suggestion is to exploit Europe’s magnitude and diversity related
to flood risk by jointly buying reinsurance or forming a risk pool. In case a
collaboration on the entire EU level is not feasible, the voluntary establishment
of Joint Risk Pooling Initiatives (JRPIs) between subsets of EU countries seems
an option worthwhile to consider. In the paper at hand we not only created the
methodological framework to actually quantify concrete diversification benefits
of such JRPIs, but also did some explicit calculations where feasible for the
data. The results presented in the paper are clearly subject to and limited to
the quality of the available data, and it will be an interesting challenge to deepen
the analysis in the future with improved and enlarged data sets. E.g., to our
knowledge smaller countries that have a strong national reinsurance tradition
may be under-represented in the utilized data set (stemming from an interna-
tional reinsurer), thus some more data gathering activities might be a valuable
undertaking from an EU-wide perspective.
For our analysis, the question who actually takes the responsibility to insure
a nation’s flood risk is not relevant. How deeply the state government should
be involved in risk transfer also may be a matter of taste and economic policy
doctrines. What our analysis clearly shows, however, is that European flood risk
is diversified in a way such that there are strong economic incentives to pool
the national risk portfolios. What also becomes clear from the analysis is that
once some role of public governance for a functioning risk transfer mechanism
for flood risk is accepted, the question of sound (damage) data provision and
publicly available risk models based on such sound data also becomes a key
requisite for providing cheap and sound insurance solutions.
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6 Appendix
In the following Tables 6 and 7, we list for completeness the resulting VaR
and ES for all distributions that were discussed in this paper. Note that some
of these distributions did not provide a good fit (see Figure 2) and are not
advised to be eventually used (that is why we identified the best fit among the
four distributions for each case), but the numbers allow to assess the sensitivity
of the resulting capital requirements on the underlying distribution used in the
model. As can be seen, the consequences can be dramatic in terms of magnitude.
Naturally, the more data there are available, the more reliable a suggestion
can be given on which class of distributions would fit best. One observation
that becomes very clear from the figures in Tables 6 and 7 is how crucially the
assumption of a truncated Pareto (instead of a non-truncated Pareto) influences
the conclusions. Note that for the non-truncated Pareto distribution fit, the
resulting estimate of α turns out to be smaller than 1 for all countries, so that
the expected shortfall in that case is infinite.
BV-2013 Pareto T. Pareto Log-Normal Weibull
Mio e % BV Mio e % BV Mio e % BV Mio e % BV Mio e
Austria 914’593 2.2 2.1× 104 2.530 23’136 0.362 3’313 0.377 3’446
Belgium 792’452 8.4× 101 6.7× 105 0.075 594 0.164 1’300 0.066 522
Bulgaria 141’053 4.3× 102 6.0× 105 1.983 2’797 0.649 915 0.478 675
Croatia 197’198 1.7 3.4× 103 - - 0.123 242 0.122 240
Cyprus 40’062 1.1 4.6× 102 0.076 30 0.017 7 0.019 8
Czech R. 323’412 4.3× 101 1.4× 105 3.181 10’289 2.558 8’272 2.087 6’750
France 6’001’039 5.7× 101 3.4× 106 - - 0.087 5’220 0.047 2’803
Germany 8’704’763 4.6× 103 4.0× 108 0.262 22’829 0.264 22’965 0.130 11’335
Greece 511’834 5.3 2.7× 104 0.189 967 0.025 128 0.021 108
Hungary 291’411 1.1× 107 3.2× 1010 - - 2.231 6’503 0.487 1’420
Ireland 286’464 2.1× 102 6.1× 105 - - 0.322 923 0.174 498
Italy 3’366’374 1.1× 107 3.7× 1011 0.570 19’183 3.712 124’974 0.820 27’608
Poland 1’065’883 3.3× 104 3.5× 108 1.794 19’120 4.365 46’531 1.393 14’853
Portugal 513’923 5.7× 101 2.9× 105 2.084 10’712 0.164 845 0.168 861
Romania 266’283 8.3× 102 2.2× 106 0.927 2’469 1.708 4’549 0.800 2’131
Slovakia 175’723 8.9× 104 1.6× 108 - - 1.204 2’116 0.440 774
Spain 2’161’979 1.1× 106 2.4× 1010 0.314 6’783 2.442 52’786 0.461 9’971
Sweden 1’175’719 5.5 6.5× 104 0.007 85 0.008 92 0.005 53
United K. 4’583’064 1.2× 104 5.5× 108 0.205 9’410 0.607 27’837 0.196 9’002
EU 31’513’229 2.7× 101 8.5× 106 0.122 38’446 0.154 48’530 0.095 29’938
Table 6: Relative and absolute Value-at-risk at 99.5% level for all discussed marginal dis-
tributions
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BV-2013 Pareto T. Pareto Log-Normal Weibull
Mio e % BV Mio e % BV Mio e % BV Mio e % BV Mio e
Austria 914,593 - - 2.784 25,462 0.477 4,359 0.427 3,903
Belgium 792,452 - - 0.075 596 0.544 4,307 0.089 703
Bulgaria 141,053 - - 1.998 2,818 1.291 1,821 0.605 853
Croatia 197,198 - - - - 0.348 687 0.176 347
Cyprus 40,062 - - 0.077 31 0.028 11 0.023 9
Czech R. 323,412 - - 3.196 10,336 3.562 11,521 2.374 7,679
France 6,001,039 - - - - 0.102 6,117 0.049 2,944
Germany 8,704,763 - - 0.263 22,890 0.497 43,229 0.159 13,834
Greece 511,834 - - 0.194 995 0.043 220 0.026 133
Hungary 291,411 - - - - 5.232 15,247 0.584 1,703
Ireland 286,464 - - - - 0.402 1,152 0.187 535
Italy 3,366,374 - - 0.572 19,255 16.133 543,089 1.158 38,995
Poland 1,065,883 - - 1.801 19,202 32.575 347,211 2.223 23,700
Portugal 513,923 - - 2.249 11,557 0.612 3,143 0.257 1,322
Romania 266,283 - - 0.928 2,472 2.513 6,693 0.903 2,406
Slovakia 175,723 - - - - 2.037 3,580 0.510 896
Spain 2,161,979 - - 0.314 6,791 9.835 212,631 0.643 13,899
Sweden 1,175,719 - - 0.007 86 0.022 264 0.006 72
United K. 4,583,064 - - 0.206 9,428 1.417 64,946 0.248 11,365
EU 31,513,229 - - 0.122 38,289 0.189 59,560 0.102 32,143
Table 7: Relative and absolute Expected Shortfall at 99% level for all discussed marginal
distributions
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